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Abstract
On End-to-end encryption for Cloud-based Services
Suryadipta Majumdar
Cloud-based services are now an integral part of everyday lives of many users. In-
deed, users who do not use Facebook, Gmail, Dropbox, GoogleDrive, QQ, Baidu or
similar services are now a rarity. These services offer seamless integration of user data
with multiple user-owned devices, reliable online backup, and enable easy and instant
communications between users. Such features, at an affordable price of zero dollars,
make these services very popular, even though they are an antithesis to user pri-
vacy, and help create large-scale surveillance programs such as NSA PRISM. Several
mechanisms have been proposed and implemented to make these services privacy-
friendly. Most past proposals rely on public key systems with user-managed private
keys, or password-based symmetric encryption. We explore a symmetric-key approach
without password-derived keys to facilitate end-to-end encryption of stored user data
(e.g., cloud storage) and communication messages (e.g., web-based email). We pro-
pose Keyfob, a key management scheme for easy key transfer between user-owned
devices, and between users. Keyfob uses high-entropy random keys for encryption in-
stead of password-derived keys, and leverages DH-EKE (Bellovin and Merritt, IEEE
S&P 1992) with weak secrets for secure key transfer. Each user needs to manage
one user-master key, and all other keys are derived from that master key or a pair-
wise shared master key. We implemented Keyfob as a Firefox extension using the
Firefox Sync service, which implements an EKE variant. Keyfob can make several
iii
applications and services privacy-friendly, if appropriate intermediate layers are im-
plemented, e.g., as plugins between a target cloud-service application and the Keyfob
extension. We have implemented two such plugins to support encrypted Dropbox
(in desktop and Android) and Gmail (in desktop). Our hope in proposing Keyfob
with a symmetric-key approach is to highlight challenges in such a lesser-explored
mechanism, and attract researchers towards the long-standing problem of enabling
end-to-end encryption in a cloud-dominated environment.
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At present, more than 1.25 billion people use different cloud services for backing up
data and sharing information, e.g., cloud storage services1, social networks2, e-mail3,
etc. All of this services deal with sensitive personal information and most user data is
stored in plaintext at a provider’s server. It seems that the majority of users finding it
acceptable that their personal photographs, payslips, intimate messages are accessible
by service providers. Possible privacy consequences are not taken into account due
to lack of awareness. A common misconception is that personal information of an
individual user is of no interest to giant service providers like Google or Dropbox.
Also, most people are unaware of the infrastructure and the underlying technology
for cloud services. They think they can hide themselves in the crowd of billion users,
which may not be true. Throughout the later half of 2013, disclosure of NSA’s






towards user privacy. At least, it is now established that user data is being leaked
from many large corporations (see [39], [24]). Even considering unawareness of privacy
among mass people, we believe that effective solutions of end-to-end encryption for
this services is a demand of time.
To facilitate end-to-end encryption in a cloud ecosystem, the main challenge is to
manage keys among different devices of the same user and between different users. In
recent years, several encrypted cloud storage services (e.g., Mega, Viivo, Wuala and
Boxcryptor) have been launched. Main approaches are:
1. encryption with public key without offering several popular features like syncing,
sharing (e.g., Syme [74]);
2. encryption with user chosen password (e.g., Boxcryptor [11]); and
3. relying on a third party key server (e.g., CaaS [21], FriendlyMail [61]).
Apart from cloud storage services, email communication is also a potential candidate
for end-to-end encryption. PGP and S/MIME are the best solutions we currently
have for email encryption, but unfortunately they have not got much popularity for
several reasons. Firstly, they are not designed for cloud mail. In a cloud-based system,
syncing a private key to user-owned devices is equally challenging as transferring
a symmetric key. Another major reason is their usability shortcomings ([34, 72]).
Both PGP and S/MIME require complex initial configuration and handling with
cryptographic artifacts [81]. Apparently, most users are not interested to protect their
own privacy with the price of significant reduction in usability. Also, service providers
have less incentive to offer end-to-end encryption, because many of their existing
features rely on unencrypted data storage. End-to-end encryption is preferable to be
added as an essential security feature in most of this services by keeping the minimal
impact.
We observe that most existing approaches are either vulnerable to a malicious
service provider or relying on a trusted party. Public key cryptosystem is the most
popular in handling key management for end-to-end encryption. Apart from above-
mentioned limitations, troubles adapting public key in cloud services are:
1. protecting keys from malicious providers; and
2. non-trivial key management.
1.2 Thesis Statement
In this work, our main objective is to propose a key management mechanism for cloud
services to facilitate end-to-end encryption with high-entropy key without relying on
a trusted party. To achieve this goal we explore following research questions:
Question 1. How can we design and implement a key manager which makes
existing popular cloud services privacy-friendly?
Question 2. What are the benefits and shortcomings of using symmetric encryp-
tion for cloud-based services?
Question 3. What are the popular cloud features we can offer with the proposed
key management mechanisms?
1.3 Contributions
At first, we identify 6 targeted features and challenges to facilitate end-to-end encryp-
tion for cloud services. We design and implement a key management scheme which
includes key transfer mechanisms and key derivation methods to transfer master keys
and derive other related keys respectively among user-owned devices as well as other
user devices. We also implement three encryption plugins for cloud storage services
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(Dropbox) and email communication (Gmail) to facilitate end-to-end encryption in
two different platforms (Windows and Android). We keep our key management mod-
ule as less dependent on cloud storage and email services as possible so that it can be
pluggable with other services easily. Additionally, our system is minimally deviated
from the existing process for the convenience of users.
Main contributions of this work are following:
1. We propose Keyfob, a key manager to facilitate privacy-friendly cloud services
without relying on user-chosen passwords for data confidentiality, and requiring
trusted third parties. Keyfob is application and service agnostic, i.e., no changes
are needed in official client applications or in the server-end; it can be used with
any specific cloud service, as long as a service-specific software plugin (e.g.,
application or browser extension) is implemented.
2. To show feasibility of Keyfob’s design, we implement plugins for Dropbox (in
desktop and Android) and Gmail (in desktop) to enable encrypted cloud stor-
age, encrypted shared content and confidential emails. Our Dropbox plugin can
also be used with several other popular cloud storage services, e.g., GoogleDrive,
OneDrive. To facilitate gradual adoption, these plugins allow encryption sup-
port for selected content (files or emails); i.e., users can still send plaintext
messages or store files unencrypted.
3. Although Keyfob relies on authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange (DH-
EKE) [7], there are no long-term public-private key pairs to maintain. Public
key based systems are numerous, but gained very little adoption. With Keyfob,
we explore a symmetric-key based system, a less-explored approach in academic
literature. We require each user to back up only one master key (a high-entropy
symmetric key) for all cloud service accounts.
4
4. Apparently as a result of the Snowden-effect, several encrypted cloud storage
mechanisms have been proposed/implemented in the recent time. We evalu-
ate these techniques, and compare Keyfob with existing key management ap-
proaches for cloud services.
1.4 Outline
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 covers some necessary back-
ground and literature related to this dissertation. In Chapter 3, we first illustrate the
threat model for this work and then define the goals for the Keyfob design. We present
the details of Keyfob design including the details of our approach of solving different
key management issues in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 includes all the implementation
details of Keyfob. In Chapter 6, we discuss the security analysis of our proposal with
the respect to our threat model. Discussion on analytical evaluations based on user




Background and Related Work
In this chapter, we discuss the necessary background and literature related to our
work.
2.1 Background
This section includes the background discussion mainly on the protocols and tools we
use in this work extensively.
2.1.1 Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE)
PAKE is a key establishment method utilizing the knowledge of password by both
parties. The basic idea behind this approach is not to include or not to be leaked
any verifiable information to stop an attacker to conduct an oﬄine guessing attack
on the password. Many PAKE-based proposals (e.g., [7, 8, 29, 30, 40, 41, 49, 82]
are available, where two parties want to authenticate to each other using a pre-
shared password and agree on a high-entropy session key to be used to protect their
subsequent communication.
EKE [7] is the first protocol in its kind. In EKE, one party sends an ephemeral
6
public key protected by pre-shared password and other party replies with the session
key encrypted by the ephemeral public key. Here, the assumption is that both parties
share a password P in advance. A simplified version of EKE is the following (see
Table 1 for the description of notations used):
1. Alice generates a random ephemeral public key EA and encrypts it with the
pre-shared password P . Alice sends to Bob
{EA}P .
2. Bob decrypts to retrieve EA from the previous message with shared password
P ; generates a random session key R; and encrypts R with both EA and P .
Bob sends to Alice
{{R}EA}P .
3. Alice decrypts the message with P and her private key for EA to obtain the
session key R.
After these three steps, both parties agree upon a high-entropy session key R. The
strength of this protocol is that any dictionary attack on “weak” secret P is infeasi-
ble. There are three versions (RSA, ElGamal and Diffie-Hellman) of EKE available
depending on the way the public/private key pair is generated. Patel [60] formed
number-theoretic attacks on all versions of EKE. For DH-EKE, the attack can be
avoided by not allowing specific choices of the generator g and prime p.
In this work, we heavily rely on EKE (more specifically, DH-EKE). To bypass the
patent on EKE, several variants of EKE, e.g., J-PAKE [37], SRP [82], SPEKE [40],
have been proposed. According to our knowledge, only J-PAKE and SRP are being
used in public systems (e.g., Firefox Sync and TLS-SRP). The patent on EKE expired
in late 2011. In this work, we focus more on DH-EKE, as DH-EKE is one of the
simplest variants of password-authenticated key agreement and also a secure option
7
(see e.g., [60]). The simplified steps are:
1. Alice generates a random exponent x; calculates gx mod n , where g is a gener-
ator and n is a prime; and encrypts it with pre-shared password P . Alice sends
the encrypted result.
2. Bob decrypts to retrieve gx mod n from the previous message with the shared
password P ; generates a random key y; encrypts gy mod n with P ; and sends
the encrypted result.
3. Alice decypts the message with P to obtain gy mod n.
After the third step, both parties agree upon the same session key, gxy mod n. Un-
like regular Diffie-Hellman, DH-EKE prevents man in the middle attack (MiTM) by
authentication.
2.1.2 Firefox Sync
We use the Firefox Sync server instead of a direct user-to-user DH-EKE because, it
is unable to connect peer-to-peer in most cases (e.g., due to the use of NAT, firewall).
Firefox Sync [56] is one of the very few real world services that use an EKE-like
protocol. It is a built-in service in Mozilla Firefox for synchronizing user data and
preferences (e.g., history, password) to all user-owned devices. Firefox Sync uses J-
PAKE [37], to establish a session key. Sync uses this session key to transfer any data
from one device to another via the Firefox Sync server. So, user data is never exposed
to the Sync server. We mainly rely on the “easy setup” step of Firefox Sync, where
a session key is established through a J-PAKE session. J-PAKE invalidates oﬄine
dictionary attacks on the pre-shared weak secret. Also, it considers the Sync server
untrusted. Below we describe the “easy setup” mechanism in Firefox Sync (Firefox
28).
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1. The Firefox Sync client requests a channel from the server. In response, the
server provides a channel ID, which is used for any further request during a
session.
2. Then, the Sync client generates a random weak Secretij and prepares a PIN by
appending the Secretij with the channel ID.
3. From another user device, the user enters the PIN generated in the previous
step. The channel ID is retrieved from the PIN.
4. Once both devices know the PIN, they can establish a session key using the
J-PAKE protocol.
The recent version of Firefox features a new Firefox Sync design [12], where the
“easy setup” step is excluded. Mozilla found that the previous design with “easy setup”
is not convenient for users having one device. Also, if users lose their master keys, then
all contents are irretrievable. The current design relies on the user-chosen password
so that encrypted contents are recoverable as long as a user has the knowledge of the
password. Additionally, the new version allows users to store contents in the Sync
server in the clear to offer full recovery. So, the security of the data depends on
the user-chosen password. As we need Firefox Sync for multiple devices, we find the
previous design more applicable for this work. Mozilla announces to continue to host
the old Sync server for a limited period of time [54]. After that to avail the old Sync
service we must run our own Sync server (see [57]). As our design only needs the
Firefox Sync server to establish the key, and does not consider the server as trusted,
running our own server should not be a concern in terms of performance or security
i.e., no data transfer or user registration (see Section 7.2 for estimated server load).
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2.1.3 Sharing secret over insecure channel
There is no efficient way to transfer a secret over an insecure channel without having
any pre-shared secret. Public-key cryptography was invented to solve this problem.
But, it fails when the integrity of the public key is not preserved in the transition and
lets an attacker to be a transparent man-in-the-middle. Apparently, most convenient
way to share a secret with a friend is to call or send an SMS to that person. But, eaves-
dropping by the mobile operators may leak the secret. Alexander and Goldberg [1]
suggested to use any previously shared experience (e.g., last movie watched together)
as secret. This approach is vulnerable if Eve gathers personal information about Al-
ice and starts sharing a secret as Bob. The attack difficulty is increased when both
parties ask two questions about two different past events to each other. We doubt
that people can keep their past experience secret in this era of social networking and
cloud services.
Quantum key distribution (see e.g., [9]) relies on the quantum channel to exchange
keys between two parties. It enables both parties to detect if the key is eavesdropped,
as the quantum message gets disturbed at the presence of an eavesdropper. But, this
approach is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attack when used without authentication
that concludes that we can not use the Quantum key distribution safely without a
pre-shared secret between two parties. We identify the de-centralized services (e.g.,
Tor, BitTorrent) as a potential candidate to transfer secret. Section 7.4 describes one
of the possibilities by leveraging Tor hidden services [77].
2.2 Related Work
In recent years, end-to-end encryption solutions especially for cloud services are get-
ting popular. In this section, we focus on the main approaches available to facilitate
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end-to-end encryption for cloud services. We identify several shortcomings in existing
approaches, which are addressed in our solution.
2.2.1 Protected email
Hallam et al. [35] and Yu et al. [42] discussed different challenges in designing an
encrypted email system. The first challenge is to avoid any trusted party in the
design. S/MIME [62] and PGP [13] are two well-known end-to-end solutions for email
encryption. PGP decentralizes the chain of trust, whereas S/MIME relies on a trusted
third party (e.g., certification authority). In PGP, email contents are encrypted by a
random symmetric key. This symmetric key is then encrypted using the recipient’s
public key and sent with the encrypted email to the receiver. Unlike other public key
based systems, PGP does not rely on PKI. PGP introduces the web of trust model for
the key distribution, where users recommend each others’ certificates. Though this
model matches with the trust model of real life, it may not be always true. Because,
users may need to certify other users, who are not known beforehand. Whitten et
al. [81] first identified the user inconvenience in the PGP protocol. They identified
that the initial configuration steps in PGP are too complicated for users. On the other
hand, S/MIME relies on PKI, which makes the key management costly and insecure.
Certificate authorities can replace public keys so that they can access user data later.
Self certificate may seem a better option, but it is not free from its own security
risks and usability issues [28]. Ryan et al. [65] proposed an encrypted email service
using PKI without any trusted party. In this proposal, service providers maintain a
public log to store public keys of all customers, so that any malice done by the service
provider can not be undetected. FriendlyMail [61] is a Firefox extension offering
encrypted email for the Gmail web interface. It encrypts email contents with random
symmetric keys. Random keys are sent separately through another channel (e.g.,
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a private message in Facebook). It requires the sender and receiver to be friends in
Facebook. The main downside of this approach is that it fails to protect confidentiality
when Google and Facebook collude or the government on top of them collects data
from both. Lavabit, Silent circle and PrivateSky [47, 68, 15] were encrypted email
services, which were shut down because of their reluctance to disclose user emails.
As most of those services offered server-side encryption, all emails were accessible by
the service providers. These incidents taught us not to rely on any trusted party
including the service providers anymore. Dark mail technical alliance [16] is a recent
effort to come up with a privacy-friendly email technology.
2.2.2 Password-based encryption systems
A popular approach is to use password to propose a privacy-friendly cloud service
(e.g., [31, 45, 66, 11, 69]). Apple’s iCloud stores all sensitive user data (e.g., password,
encryption keys) into the iCloud Keychain. It offers users to sync their secrets to all
user-owned devices. The first user device creates a public/private key pair. Public
keys are stored as a “circle” in the iCloud server after being protected by user’s
iCloud password, and signed by the device’s private key. To access the public key an
attacker must authenticate with the user password, and to modify the public key an
attacker must provide the original device’s private key. To add a new device, user’s
existing device authenticates the new device with user’s iCloud password. Once the
authentication succeeds, the old device adds the public key of the new device to the
“circle”. The public key is signed by both the private key and iCloud’s password.
Then both devices can upload to the iCloud server by encrypting with each other’s
public key. According to our knowledge, iCloud Keychain is the only public-key based
service which offers syncing without transferring the private key. As the pairing of
a new device relies on the user password, only online attack on password is feasible.
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Unfortunately, recent finding [83] on undocumented forensic services running on every
iPhone device shows that any surveillance on iPhone users is feasible. Apparently,
Apple knows about the backdoor and keeps updating these forensic services. The
file_relay service is responsible for giving access to many sensitive user data and the
dump of all metadata.
Google recently announced the Chrome extension end-to-end [31], which is a
JavaScript implementation of OpenPGP. To support multiple user-owned devices,
end-to-end transfers the private key protected by a user-chosen password or pass-
phrase. So, a successful brute force attack on user password allow Google to access
user emails. Yahoo recently announced to launch a similar encryption plugin for their
email service [25]. Yahoo’s plugin will be a modified version of Google’s end-to-end,
though the details of the design is still unavailable. Boxcryptor [11], which is a cloud
storage encryption plugin, works with major cloud storage providers (e.g., Dropbox,
Google Drive, OneDrive), similarly protects private keys by user-chosen password. In
Boxcryptor, each file is encrypted by a random key and each user has a public/private
key pair. Random keys are encrypted by public keys of each user, who has access to
that file and stored in the local cloud storage directory. All public keys are in the
clear and private keys are encrypted by user password; both keys are stored in the
cloud storage server to facilitate sharing and syncing. To share a file with other users,
the file key is encrypted with the receiver’s public key and submitted to the cloud so
that the receiver can retrieve the file key by decrypting using her private key.
MiniLock [52] is a file encryption service. It generates public/private keypairs
from user pass-phrases. Public keys are considered as miniLock ID. Users exchange
their miniLock IDs prior to sending any file. Using the elliptic curve cryptography,
miniLock generates public/private keys small enough to share through tweets. To
encrypt a file, the sender drag the desired file and recipient’s miniLock ID. All files are
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encrypted by the recipient’s public key before leaving sender’s device. The recipient
can decrypt the file by entering her email address and passphrase.
There are several symmetric-key-based solutions, where in most of the cases en-
cryption key is derived from a password. The Safebox [66] cloud storage service
encrypts all user data with the password-derived key. To support syncing, Safebox
does not need any additional key distribution. A user device can sync all data from
the Safebox server, and decrypt them using the key derived from the user’s mas-
ter password. Wuala [45] is another encrypted cloud storage service, which derives
the master key from the user-chosen password. The master key encrypts the root
directory. Other encryption keys reside in the parent directory so that a user hav-
ing the encryption key of a folder can access all the files and sub-folders inside the
folder. SpiderOak [69] offers both syncing and sharing. All user data is encrypted by
symmetric keys. Encryption keys are protected by the user password. To facilitate
sharing, SpiderOak requires a user to create a share room. Each share room has a
password, which is used to encrypt all data in that room. All the members of a room
know the password for the room. Trrst [79] is an encrypted and anonymous blogging
platform. Trrst transfers a private key protected by the user chosen-password. The
main downside of these solutions is that the security of the system is dependent on
the strength of user-chosen password. It is observed that people usually choose a
weak password (see e.g., [70]).
2.2.3 Trusted third party
CaaS [21] introduced a semi-trusted third party to manage encryption keys. CaaS
leverages one-time padding encryption to achieve associativity. The sender add her
layer of encryption before sending to the CaaS server and remove the layer before
sending to the service provider. All contents at the service provider are encrypted by
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the CaaS key. In this proposal, a sender, receiver and CaaS server (third party) have
their own encryption keys. At first a sender sends the file encrypted by her key to the
CaaS server. CaaS encrypts the file again with its key and sends back to the sender.
Then, the sender removes her encryption and leaves the file encrypted by the CaaS
key for the cloud storage server. This system uses the one-time padding encryption
algorithm to achieve associativity. The receiver of the file downloads it and forwards
to the CaaS server after encrypting by the receiver’s key. The CaaS returns the file
to the receiver after removing its layer of encryption. Then the file is only encrypted
by the receiver’s key. Thus user data is never exposed to the cloud storage provider
and CaaS server. CaaS requires user registration with email address and password
so that the CaaS server can store encryption keys against user email addresses. Also,
CaaS enforces the usage of SSL between client and service providers including the
CaaS server to avoid any MiTM. Otherwise, an attacker can collect encryption keys
as well as encrypted user data from the user communication with the CaaS server
and service providers. If the CaaS server and cloud server colludes then user data
will be exposed.
2.2.4 Other approaches
Syme [74] is an encrypted group conversation service. Each member of a group has
a public/private keypair, and also knows other members’ public keys. To exchange
public keys with a new member, an ephemeral keypair is generated by the new member
and transferred in the clear through the Syme server. Each file is encrypted with
random keys. All the encryption keys are encrypted by the public keys of all members
of a group and stored in a key file; the key file is available to all group members. Also,
each group member knows other members’ public keys. Whenever a new member is
added to the group, an ephemeral keypair is generated by the Syme client. Ephemeral
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keypairs are transferred through the Syme server to exchange public keys. Once a
member has public keys of all the members, she can securely communicate with others.
The main weakness of Syme is that it relies on the service provider during the steps
of transferring public keys using an ephemeral keypair. As ephemeral public keys are
transferred in the clear, the Syme server can replace ephemeral public keys so that
false public keys of other members can be sent to a new member. Thus the Syme
server will be able to access all the future posts from that the newly added member.
If the server acts maliciously from the starting of a group, then all conversations for
the group will be readable by the server.
SafeSlinger [22] offers a key exchange mechanism highly depending on the multi-
value commitments and group Diffie-Hellman key agreement (e.g., STR [43]). The
purpose is to share a secret over a group while they are meeting in person so that
the secret can be used to protect future communication. SafeSlinger avoids O(n2)
communications for key exchange between n members of a group. The major steps
of SafeSlinger are:
1. Data selection. The user selects the contact information to be shared.
2. Group size. The user enters the size of the group.
3. Group selection. Each member of the group is provided a unique ID. To identify
as a same group to the server, all members enter the lowest ID of the group.
4. Data and commitment distribution. Each device submits the encrypted data
and commitments to the server.
5. Verification. By matching three word phrases among all members, users verify
the integrity of commitments.
6. Shared secret. Each device derive the group key from the received commitments
and own private key using the group Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
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7. Data retrieval. User data is encrypted by random keys. Random keys are
distributed after encrypting them by the group key. So, all legitimate members
of the group is able to decrypt the data.
SafeSlinger is able to exchange keys between group members without exposing
keys to the server. But, it requires all group members to be present at the same time.
If the group size is 2, then the communication for key exchange will be O(n2).
CrowdShare [5] is a resource sharing mechanism using mobile tethering. A key
server generates public/private key pairs for encrypting messages between mobile
devices. As resource sharing steps do not involve the server, accessing the encrypted
messages is difficult for the server. ARKpX [4] offers client side encryption without




Threats & Design Goals
In this chapter, we define our threat model and identify the goals to achieve with our
proposal.
3.1 Threat model
3.1.1 Service-provider related assumptions
For user data at rest or in-transit, we assume service providers (cloud storage
providers/ISPs) are a curious attacker, i.e., they would always prefer to have access
to plaintext user data, for reasons including: profiling users and target ads. We also
assume these providers are non-malicious in terms of availability and functionality
(i.e., no DoS attacks on users), and take adequate steps to safeguard their resources
(but possibly not enough to deter government agencies). During authentication, we
assume all communications between a client and server are SSL/TLS protected. We
also assume all out-of-band channels are eavesdropped (see e.g., [75]). We do not trust
providers for not sharing user data with third parties, for legal or business reasons;
i.e., service providers can collude with each other or with government agencies. For
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password-protected keys (symmetric/private), we model the providers as malicious
entities, when they have access to such password-protected keys; i.e., they will launch
large-scale brute-force attacks to expose such keys, or use password cracking services
for hire, e.g., the Stricture Consulting Group.1 We also assume service providers as
malicious if they are used for sharing public keys between users (e.g., [46]); i.e., they
can replace user public keys to launch a simple man-in-the-middle attack.
3.1.2 End-user related assumptions
We have several types of keys in Keyfob: user master key (unique for each user),
pair-wise shared master key (between each user pair), application keys, and per-
item keys (for each data item, e.g., file or email content). Users must protect all
keys from exposure. We assume all user devices are malware-free, which is a rather
difficult goal to achieve, especially against targeted/government-sponsored attacks
(e.g., TURBINE [27]). Backing up the user master key is critical for Keyfob. Several
possibilities of backing up the master key are discussed in Section 4.4. On the recipient
side, backing up the pair-wise master key is strongly recommended; otherwise, a new
DH-EKE session must be performed to get the key from the initiator/sender. For the
DH-EKE secret, we assume it is shared between users out-of-band (e.g., phone call,
SMS), where both parties at least know each other’s contact numbers, or through an
online channel that cannot be tied to specific users (e.g., message transmitted via Tor
hidden services). We assume an attacker will be detected if she tries to play the role




The primary goal of Keyfob is to enable easy key management to support end-to-end
encryption between all user devices and between users. Our target features include:
1. Secure existing cloud services, instead of introducing a new ‘secure’ service. Pro-
viding strong security guarantees of user data from a cloud provider is possibly
impractical (cf. the Lavabit affair [17]).
2. Introduce no trusted third-parties for key transfer or as a key server. We use
Firefox Sync for key transfer, where the Sync server is untrusted.
3. Support multi-device key syncing, assuming most users own more than a single
device, and user devices may be unable to connect peer-to-peer (e.g., due to
the use of NAT, firewall). We use the Firefox Sync service (modified on the
client-side) to support this feature. Note that, we are not concerned of syncing
encrypted user data, for which we rely on existing services.
4. Enable secure content sharing between users. For cloud storage services, sharing
files between users is a very popular feature.
5. Support multiple services/applications (e.g., cloud storage, email, instant mes-
saging, social networking) using the same master key (for single-user) or the
same pair-wise master key (between users). We currently target cloud storage
and web email services for our implementation. We design Keyfob for easy
integration of other services.
6. Simplify key management tasks for users. We choose a symmetric-key approach
instead of public-key, as apparently understanding a two-key (public-private)
scheme is less straightforward than a single-key symmetric scheme (symmetric
keys are more similar to real-world keys). We also must enable easy backup of
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master keys. We want to keep the key-establishment procedure a one-time step,




This chapter describes the details of key management mechanisms for Keyfob.
4.1 Design overview
Figure 1 illustrates major steps in Keyfob for single-user and two-user cases. For both
cases, a master key (either KUi or KUij) encrypted by a session key is transferred
through the Firefox Sync server; the session key is established using a PIN by a DH-
EKE session. The PIN is sent out of band. For the single-user case, the encrypted file
and encrypted key database are synced through Dropbox. Device 2 gets the master
key through Sync; retrieves the key database; and finally decrypts all files. For the
two-user case, the encrypted file and encrypted key database are sent through the
Dropbox server. User 2 receives the shared master key through the Firefox Sync
server; retrieves encryption key; and finally reads the file. Figure 2 illustrates the
steps of encrypted email service with Keyfob. The encrypted email and encrypted
key are sent through the Gmail server. User 2 receives the shared master key through
the Firefox Sync server; retrieves encryption key; and finally reads the email. Below
we discuss our key management mechanisms for both single-user and two-user cases
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Figure 1: Keyfob overview: for a single user, the master key is transferred via Firefox
Sync using a PIN, and other keys and encrypted files are synced through the cloud
storage server to another user-owned device; and for multiple users, a shared master
key is transferred via Firefox Sync using a PIN, and both the encrypted key and
the encrypted file are sent through the cloud server. In both cases, a dotted arrow
indicates out of band transmission. Each file is encrypted by a per-file key and the
per-file key is encrypted by the application-specific key, which is derived from a master
key.
focusing mainly on the cloud storage services. Our design supports other services
(e.g., email) involving two users in a similar manner.
4.2 Key derivation
We choose to use key derivation to limit the number of keys needed to be stored.
There is only one master key for each user. Table 1 defines the notation used.
We categorize the main features of cloud services into two groups: 1) features





= Encrypted by high-entropy key
= PIN
= Per- le keys
= Pair-wise shared master key
Figure 2: Keyfob overview for Gmail: a shared master key is transferred via Fire-
fox Sync using a PIN, and both the encrypted key and the encrypted email are sent
through the mail server. In both cases, a dotted arrow indicates out of band trans-
mission. Each email is encrypted by a per-file key and the per-file key is encrypted
by the application-specific key, which is derived from a master key.
(e.g., file sharing). Key derivation for both categories is handled similarly. The master
key (KUi) for a user is randomly generated on the first run of Keyfob. Whenever a
new file is added (or email is composed), a random key (KFi) is generated. KFi is
used to encrypt itemi (e.g., file or email). For the single-user case, at the first use of
each application an app-specific master key (KAi) is derived where KAi= HKDF(KUi ,
Appi). Encryption keys (KFi) are protected by this KAi . For the two-user case, a
shared master key (KUij) between Useri and Userj is derived as KUij= HKDF(KUi ,
Useri ‖ Userj), where Useri is the initiator. App-specific master key (KAij) is
calculated as KAij= HKDF(KUij , Appi). KAij is further used to encrypt any random
keys between Useri and Userj. This key derivation requires one-time key transfer of
KUi for single user and one-time key transfer of KUij for a pair of users.
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Appi Name of application i (e.g., “Dropbox”)
Useri Name of user i (unique for a contact list)
ChannelID As defined in Firefox Sync
Secretij Pre-shared secret between Useri and Userj
PIN (ChannelID ‖ Secretij), where ‖ represents string concatenation
KS Derived from a DH-EKE session key
KUi Master key of Useri
KAi Application specific key of Useri
KFi Randomly generated encryption key for itemi
{X}K X encrypted by K using authenticated encryption
KUij Pair-wise sharing key between Useri and Userj
KAij Application specific key between Useri and Userj
Table 1: Notation used
4.3 Key transfer
Our key transfer process mainly consists of transferring KUi to all user-owned devices
and sharing KUij with a peer user. We leverage Firefox Sync and DH-EKE for key
transfer. We replace J-PAKE with DH-EKE as the key establishment protocol, as DH-
EKE is simpler in terms of computational complexity and total steps in the protocol
than J-PAKE. Details of DH-EKE and Firefox Sync are discussed in Section 2.1.
Figure 3 shows the steps of establishing a DH-EKE session key for both single-user
and two-user cases. This session key is then used for key transfer.
A PIN is the pre-shared secret, which is formed by concatenating the ChannelID
and a Secretij. Firefox Sync generates the Secretij randomly. We introduce user-
chosen Secretij as an option so that the users might share the Secretij prior to the
key transfer session. The PIN is shared with Device 2 through any other channel.
Sharing secret over insecure channel is an open problem. We discuss existing methods
in Section 2.1. Once the connection is established between two devices, Device 1
initiates the DH-EKE protocol to establish a session key (KS).
Single-user. Figure 4 shows the steps of a single-user case, when peer-to-peer com-
munication between user-owned devices is not possible. Device 1 sends master key
25




















Figure 3: Key establishment protocol: session key establishment for both single-user
and two-user cases. Here, KS = KDF(g
xy mod p).
(KUi) encrypted by session key over the same channel through the Firefox Sync server.
As discussed in Section 4.2, for a single user, after having the master key, all other
keys are derivable or retrievable. Device 2 next can derive the application specific
key (KAi). All encrypted files and encrypted file keys are synced through the regular
cloud service. So, Device 2 is able to decrypt all the files properly.
Two-user. Figure 5 shows the steps of a two-user case. Once a pair of users establish
a session key (KS), User1, having the master key (KUij), sends it encrypted by the
session key over the same channel through which the session key is established. From

















Figure 4: Key and data transfer protocol for the single-user case
between that pair are derivable or retrievable. User 2 next can derive the application
specific key (KAij). All encrypted files and encrypted file keys are synced through the
regular cloud service. So, User 2 is able to decrypt all the files properly.
4.4 Key backup
Backing up of user master key (KUi) is essential in Keyfob. If a KUi is lost, then
all encrypted contents of the corresponding user (Useri) becomes irretrievable. We
lack an efficient way to store a cryptographic key oﬄine. Not relying on any device
limits the available options. Most existing solutions ask users to take a note or print
of the key. Mercury [50] derives public/private key from user-selected content (i.e.,
private image, audio, video). A user backs up the file instead of the private key.
Alternatively, it offers key generation from random seed. The random seed in this
case can be converted into a QR code and printed for oﬄine storage. Krivoruchko et
al. [44] derives the RSA key from a user-chosen pass-phrase so that users can avoid















Figure 5: Key and data transfer protocol for the two-user case
Keyfob generates 256 bits long master keys, it is difficult for users to write them for
backup without any mistake. S/Key [36] converts random bits into meaningful words.
We adapt their approach and represent master keys as a collection of meaningful
words so that user-mistake is less probable and also more detectable. Keyfob shows
this converted master key in big fonts for user convenience in case the user wants to
take a note. We offer users to take a print of the QR code of their master key to store
somewhere secure. In case, the QR code can be scanned and the master key can be
retrieved. As Keyfob derives pair-wise master keys (KUij) from the identifier of the
contacts and requires users to use the same identifier always for a specific peer, we
feel that many users might want to store the contacts oﬄine. In Keyfob, users can
import their contacts into a file and later can refer to the file to use the same name.
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4.5 Miscellaneous key management issues
Key recovery. Key recovery is one of the important features for any privacy-friendly
system. Most systems depend on the password to recover the user data. In this work,
we avoid any usage of password for recovery. We also notice that, a weak recovery
mechanism can lead to undesired taking over of any account (see e.g., [38]). To avoid
compromising with the security, Keyfob asks users to back up their own master key
(KUi). Firefox Sync also required users to backup a master key to recover encrypted
data. But, recently Sync has introduced a password-based key recovery mechanism,
because the previous key recovery requirements were found unpopular to the users
(see [80]). We acknowledge that the overhead of storing a master key only for the
browser data might not be acceptable. In our case, we ask users to store a master
key so that they can recover their data from different cloud services.
Note that we want a user to back up a single key (KUi) to recover all other keys
including shared master keys. All keys required for the single-user case are derivable
from KUi . So, as long as a user can present her KUi , she is able to retrieve all her
data in different cloud services. Next, we discuss a key recovery mechanism for the
two-user case. There are three possible scenarios, when a user might need to recover
her shared master key:
1. All but one user-owned devices have lost the shared master key. Those devices
can recover the key through Keyfob from the only device without requiring the
user to input her master key.
2. All user-owned devices have lost the shared key (KUij), but the peer has it. The
user having the key can share it through Keyfob with the other peer. In such a
case, the master key is transferred during a complete DH-EKE session through
the Firefox Sync server from one device to another.
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3. None of the users in a pair has the key. As the shared master key (KUij) is
derived from the master key (KUi) of the initiator and identifiers of both users,
it is recoverable by the initiating user. So, we need to store the initiator’s
identity. At any point, the initiator can derive the key, and transfer it to her
peer using a similar Keyfob session as the regular key transfer.
Key deletion & key reset. Our solution stores the master key in the local machine.
In case of changing ownership, a user might want to delete the master key so that
the new owner can not retrieve any of his contents. We provide an option to delete
the key, even though it does not ensure complete unavailability of the key (see [63]).
To reset a master key, Keyfob derives app-specific keys (KAi) for single-user case and
shared master keys for two-user case from the new KUi ; and re-encrypts all item-




The major part of this thesis work is to implement the Keyfob tool and encryption
plugins. In this chapter, we discuss the details of our implementation along with the
challenges we faced during the implementation phase. Two major modules of our
implementation are: the key transfer tool and encryption plugin. Keyfob is the key
transfer tool, which is implemented as a Firefox extension for desktops and an Android
app for mobile devices. There are three encryption plugins implemented in this work
to offer end-to-end encryption for Dropbox and Gmail. To benefit a large number
of users, we choose Windows and Android environments for the Dropbox plugin.
This Dropbox plugin works with other cloud storage services (e.g., GoogleDrive and
OneDrive), except the sharing feature, which requires service-specific API calls. The
Gmail plugin is a Firefox extension, which works in a desktop environment.
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Figure 6: Keyfob UI: entering pre-shared secret while pairing a device
5.1 Keyfob implementation
5.1.1 Firefox extension for desktop
Keyfob is a Firefox extension, which is developed on top of the Firefox Sync source
code. We take the services/sync module from mozilla-central [58], which is the main
working branch of Mozilla Firefox. We want to use the code of “easy setup” (see [53]),
which includes key establishment and key transfer in Firefox Sync. Note that Firefox
Sync uses the “easy setup” only for the single-user case. While porting the code, we
notice that there are dependencies between Sync and other modules. Our first task is
to port all the necessary sources to make Sync working from the Keyfob extension. At
the end, we imported 18 source files from 4 different modules. Note that we use the
Firefox Sync server only for the key establishment. Unlike Firefox Sync, Keyfob does
not require any registration. Keyfob stores all keys in a SQLite database (keyDB),
which is populated with shared master keys and identifiers of peers.
5.1.1.1 Sending a key
To share a key between users and devices, a user initiates the process by selecting
the send key option from the Keyfob menu. Under the send key option, a user is
asked to input a name (Useri) as an identifier. In case of transferring own key, a
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user inputs “me” as an identifier. Otherwise, the identifier is the receiver’s Useri.
Keyfob returns the key stored under that identifier. If the identifier is not found
in keyDB, Keyfob generates a random key, and stores it into keyDB. Before the
key establishment, Keyfob forms the PIN by concatenating 8-character long Secretij
(random or user-chosen) and 4-character long ChannelID. Once the session key is
established, the master key (KUi or KUij) encrypted by the session key is transferred
via the same channel that establishes the session key. We generate a 256-bit random
exponent by Mozilla crypto API [58]. Other parameters (generator and modulus)
of DH-EKE are chosen from RFC 5114 [48]. We choose the bigInt.js [6] library for
computing and sjcl.js [71] for encrypting messages for DH-EKE. To hide the fact
that we are using DH-EKE instead of J-PAKE, we replace the gx1 value of J-PAKE
with gx and keep the format of the message similar as J-PAKE. To maintain the
synchronization of messages transferred between a sender and a receiver, we follow
Firefox Sync and build an asynchronous callback chain. Several times we got blocked
(each time for 5-10 minutes) by the Firefox Sync server while implementing Keyfob.
To test the connection with the Sync server and also to test Keyfob features, we
created hundreds of connections without completing each session. We assume that
highly frequent requests and incomplete sessions to the Sync server cause blocking
(see [53]). A user should not face any blocking, as Keyfob does not issue incomplete
sessions in the regular mode, and also our solution requires infrequent key transfer
through the Sync server.
5.1.1.2 Receiving a key
In Keyfob a receiver is either another device of the same user, or a device from
another user. At the very beginning, the receiver is asked to enter a name (Useri)
as an identifier and pre-shared PIN; the PIN is sent to her out of band. In case of
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transferring own key, a user inputs “me” as an identifier. Otherwise, the identifier is
the sender’s Useri. Then Keyfob extracts ChannelID from the PIN and requests a
connection from the Firefox Sync server. After that both parties can start exchanging
DH-EKE messages to establish a session key (KS). Thus at the receiver end, Keyfob
gets KUi or KUij and stores the key under the identifier entered at the first step.
5.1.2 Android version of Keyfob
We intend to port the Keyfob extension for the Android environment. Firstly, we
notice that Firefox introduces bootstrapped add-ons for the Android browser. As
our desktop extension is an overlay-based add-on, simple porting is not possible from
desktop to Android. Next, we identify that essential mozilla services (e.g., rest,
util, constants) for Firefox Sync are unavailable in Firefox Android, which stops us
building an extension with existing desktop implementation even by careful merg-
ing. Finally, we look into the Firefox Sync source code for Android from the “/mo-
bile/android/base/sync” module under the mozilla-central code branch. Unlike desk-
top implementation, Firefox Sync for Android is developed in Java. This observation
redirects us to import the Firefox Sync implementation for Android to an Android
app. We implement Keyfob as an Android app, where the key establishment and
UI are mostly ported from the Firefox Sync source. Unavailibility of mozilla crypto
service in Java increases the size of the code for Android.
5.2 Dropbox plugin
5.2.1 User experience
Figures 7, 8, 9, 10, 12 illustrate required user steps for different use cases. Figure 7
shows the step of setting up Keyfob in the first device for Dropbox. To use our
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Start installation
Install Keyfob and 
  Dropbox plugin
Choose the root 
     directory 
Access EncFS virtual 
drive for ﬁle access
Figure 7: Use case: to start installation
Dropbox plugin, a user must also install the Keyfob Firefox extension. On the first
run of the Dropbox plugin, a user is asked to choose the paths where the encrypted
files and the plaintext files will be stored. We do not force users to encrypt everything
in their Dropbox storage. The user-chosen root directory for the encrypted files must
reside in a Dropbox local folder, so that the files get uploaded to the Dropbox cloud
storage server by the Dropbox desktop client. The user accesses plaintext files from
the EncFS [32] virtual drive.
The steps of adding a new device is illustrated in Figure 8 and Figure 9. To add a
device, the user selects the “Send key” option from an existing device using the Keyfob
extension; enters the identifier as “me”; and either notes the PIN generated with the
random Secretij or enters the pre-shared password with the channel ID depending
on the user choice.
From the new device, the user must use the Keyfob extension; select the “Receive
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Figure 8: Use case: to send a key to other device or user
To share an encrypted file with a peer, the peer must have the Keyfob extension and
our Dropbox plugin installed. The user experience to a share key is almost the same
as adding own devices. In this case, users enter Useri of the receiver. To share a file
with a peer (see Figure 10), the user selects the file; chooses the “Share with Keyfob”
option from the right click menu (same as Figure 11); and shares the generated file
URL with the intended peer (e.g., via email). To receive a file (see Figure 12), the
user downloads the file from the given URL; stores the file in the EncFS virtual
drive; chooses the “Shared with Keyfob” option from the right click menu selecting
the file; and enters the identifier of the sender. Our Dropbox plugin then retrieves
the encryption key from the shared key file, and stores it in the local key database so
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    Enter the identiﬁer 
        of the sender
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Figure 9: Use case: to add a new device at the receiver end
5.2.2 Desktop plugin
Our Windows encryption plugin is built on top of EncFS 1.7.4, which is an en-
crypted virtual filesystem in user-space originally implemented for Linux. We use
encfs4win [84] (open-source EncFS project for Windows) for our implementation.
Main dependencies of EncFS are FUSE [26], RLog [64], OpenSSL [59] and Boost [10]
libraries. We modified EncFS significantly in terms of user experience, encryption
configuration and key handling. A user-chosen password is not required, so we re-
move password prompts. Apart from password, EncFS originally asks users for en-
cryption configurations (e.g., encryption algorithm, key size, block size) on the first
run. Majority of everyday users lack in-depth security knowledge and may be unable
to choose these configurations in a proper manner. By default, we set AES-CBC
with 256-bit key. There is an option to change the encryption configuration later.
We exclude filename encryption from our current implementation. EncFS originally
stores all encryption configurations including encryption key protected by a password
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Figure 10: Use case: to share a file
in a configuration file generated by the Boost serialization library. We keep this file
containing all configurations except the key. Unlike EncFS, our plugin generates per-
file encryption keys; encrypts them with app-specific key (KAi); and stores them in
a SQLite database (keyDB). Encrypted files and keyDB reside in a Dropbox direc-
tory, so that they are automatically synced to all user-owned devices. The master
key, which decrypts per-file encryption keys, is transferred through Keyfob. Each
time a user wants to access files, she must access the EncFS virtual drive instead of
a Dropbox local directory.
In Windows, we follow the regular Dropbox desktop client to provide almost the
same user experience while sharing files with peers. To access the user Dropbox folder,
our app must authenticates and takes user permission. A successful authentication
process provides an access token, which is used for later access to the Dropbox folder.
Note that our app has access only to the user-chosen root directory at the very first
step in a user’s Dropbox storage, which contains encrypted files generated by our
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Figure 11: Keyfob UI: selecting file for sharing
Dropbox plugin. We add the “Share” option on the right click menu which triggers
the Dropbox API (createShareableUrl) [18] call to generate a shareable link for the
file, which is copied to the clipboard by our plugin. Peers can access the encrypted file
using the URL and download it to their encrypted virtual drive. A user provides the
identifier of the sender of the file. The shared master key is transferred through Keyfob
and stored in keyDB under the same identifier. The plugin fetches the encryption
key from keyDB and decrypts the file.
5.2.3 Android plugin
Our Dropbox plugin is an Android app implemented on top of Cryptonite [67] (open-
source EncFS project for Android), which contains the EncFS 1.7.4 source code along
with all dependency libraries. Cryptonite implements their own user interface for
Android. One of the major changes we made in desktop plugin is UI-related e.g.,
disabling password prompts, fixed the encryption configuration for the first time. So,
a simple swapping of the EncFS module did not work. Also, we notice that the EncFS
module in Android contains additional code under the flag “ANDROID”. We merge
our modified EncFS for desktop and the EncFS module in Cryptonite carefully so that
no Android-specific code is affected. Figures 13, 14, 15 and 16 are few screenshots of
our Android plugin.
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To receive a le
      
Download les from the 
gven URLs to the EncFS 
          virtual drive
    Enter the identi er 
        in the textbox
    Choose the le and 
press "Shared with Keyfob" 
               option 
Figure 12: Use case: to receive a shared file
5.3 Gmail plugin
5.3.1 User experience
We require users to use the Keyfob extension and our Gmail encryption plugin to
get the encrypted email support in Gmail’s web interface. If the shared master key
is not already transferred to the receiver side, a sender must use Keyfob to transfer
the shared master key with the receiver. To send an encrypted email (see Figure 20),
a user chooses the “Secret Compose” (see Figure 17) button instead of the regular
“Compose” button.
Figure 18 shows a compose window, which looks the same except it contains a
“Secret send” button. A user has the same experience while composing the email.
Once the “Secret send” button is pressed the encrypted message (see Figure 19) and
the encrypted key are sent to the recipient. Except the key transfer steps through
Keyfob, we offer almost the same experience as the regular Gmail. At the recipient
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Figure 13: Android plugin UI: home screen
end, the encrypted email appears as the same as other regular emails. The receiver
reads the decrypted email without any additional effort.
5.3.2 Implementation details
We build our Gmail encryption plugin on top of FriendlyMail [61], which is a Firefox
extension offering encrypted Gmail service with key transfer through Facebook. The
source of the project is publicly available. As we have Keyfob to transfer the master
key to the receiver side, we do not require any trusted third party (e.g., Facebook) to
transfer encryption keys. So, we exclude the key transfer implementation of Friendly-
Mail in our Gmail plugin. Each email is encrypted using a 128-bit random encryption
key. For encryption and random key generation, we use the sjcl.js library [71]. We
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Figure 14: Android plugin UI: encrypted directory
extract the recipient email address to fetch the corresponding shared key from the
key database. Then using HKDF, we derive the Gmail-specific key (KAij) to encrypt
the per-email encryption keys. We append the encrypted per-email key at the end
of the encrypted message with an appropriate flag so that we can identify the key
data portion in the encrypted message. Figure 19 shows an encrypted email produced
by our plugin. For message encryption, we use authenticated encryption offered by
the sjcl.js library so that we can verify the integrity of the encrypted message at the
recipient side. At the receiver side, we extract the encrypted key from the whole
message. We also collect the sender’s email address from the message body, and
fetch the corresponding shared master key from the key database. The shared mas-
ter key reveals the per-email key, which is used to decrypt the email message. The
whole encryption or decryption process does not involve the user. Currently we do
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Figure 15: Android plugin UI: uploading file from local directories to the encrypted
directory
not support encryption for attachments or emails to multiple recipients. To support
multiple email addresses of a Useri, we allow users to update their existing contact
information to add two or more email addresses.
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Figure 16: Android plugin UI: encrypted directory
Figure 17: Gmail plugin UI: “Secret compose” button
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Figure 18: Gmail plugin UI: A plaintext Gmail message
Figure 19: Gmail plugin UI: Sample encrypted Gmail message
To send an email
      
Press "Secret Compose" 
in the Gmail webmail
Press "Secret Send" once 
  the email is composed




In this chapter, we discuss the threats that are addressed by Keyfob and also the
ones that we can not address. In this work, we mainly consider the threats from the
curious and malicious providers. We also cover the threats from the eavesdropper
and man-in-the-middle.
6.1 Threats from malicious service providers
We consider the Firefox Sync server (or any alternative implementation of it), cloud
services (e.g., Dropbox, Gmail) and network providers (e.g., ISPs) as service providers.
None of these providers can access plaintext user content or keys in Keyfob. User
content is encrypted by unique random keys; service providers see only encrypted
content and encrypted keys, and master keys are transferred through DH-EKE, which
prevents oﬄine attacks on the PIN. All keys are long (e.g., 128 bits), and generated
from a good RNG source or derived from a random key. Thus, brute-forcing a key is
considered infeasible.
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6.1.1 Online guessing of PIN
First, we consider that the attacker does not know the ChannelID. If a wrong PIN
is entered, both parties end up with two different session keys. According to our
current implementation of DH-EKE during the challenge response phase, the enter
of wrong PIN is identified and the session is aborted with an exception message (jp-
kae.error.keymismatch [53]). So, to discard a single password from the dictionary, the
attacker must exchange all DH-EKE messages with a legitimate user. This require-
ment makes consecutive try difficult. If an attacker knows the ChannelID and wants
to guess the Secretij, then the attacker must exchange all DH-EKE messages, which
includes 6 HTTP GET requests, to know the outcome of a guess. The Firefox Sync
server deletes the ChannelID after 6 successful GETs. So, the attacker only gets one
chance to guess the PIN with a known ChannelID.
6.1.2 Leaked Channel IDs
Currently, ChannelIDs are deleted after 6 successful GETs, or after 5 minutes by the
Sync server. Consider a scenario, where a ChannelID is leaked and Firefox inten-
tionally stops deleting ChannelIDs. It lets an attacker to try all possibilities of the
random part of a PIN. However, due to the use of DH-EKE, the attacker cannot
verify his guesses oﬄine. So, it is not possible to brute force the PIN without brute
forcing the long DH-EKE session key.
6.1.3 Leaked PIN
Exposure of a PIN before key establishment allows a man-in-the-middle attack for
both random and user-chosen Secretij. If the PIN is leaked after the DH-EKE session
key is established, then we have the following two cases. When a PIN is generated
with a unique random Secretij, deriving the session key from the leaked PIN and
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encrypted messages is infeasible. However, when a user-chosen password is used for
PIN generation in several DH-EKE sessions, an exposed password can lead to man-in-
the-middle attacks for subsequent key establishment sessions; in this case, an attacker
also must know the per-session ChannelID.
6.1.4 Eavesdropping out-of-band channels
As soon as a ChannelID is requested from the Sync server, all out-of-band channels
may be eavesdropped to get the PIN for that session, assuming the PIN will be shared
by such a channel in real-time (i.e., the PIN is generated using a random Secretij,
not a pre-shared password). Here, an attacker’s goal is to impersonate a receiving
user. To target a specific user, the attacker must correlate two users who are trying
to establish a DH-EKE session with a given ChannelID, using IP addresses or other
user-identifying information. We recommend using a pre-shared Secretij (preferably
shared via an in-person meeting) to generate the PIN; see also Section 2.1 or use a
channel that is difficult to attribute to specific user (e.g., SMS from a phone with a
cash-purchased SIM card, Tor hidden services).
6.1.5 Impersonation attack
In Keyfob, a user, who initiates a session, is responsible to share the PIN with the
other peer in case they do not have any pre-shared Secretij. A possible attack scenario
is that Eve, pretending to be Bob, initiates and completes a key establishment session
with Alice. At the first step, Eve transfers a PIN to Alice as Bob through an out-of-
band channel (e.g., phone call, SMS). According to our assumption, both parties at
least know each other’s contact numbers. With this assumption, the above mentioned
attack is feasible if an attacker has physical access to Bob’s phone or if the mobile
network operators eavesdrop. If the service provider impersonates any of the users,
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the scenario will be the same as above except the provider already knows the channel
ID. But, still the provider must know the PIN. Note that sharing a secret over an
insecure channel (i.e., without integrity protection) is yet an open problem. We
discuss existing and possible solutions to this problem in Section 2.1. If users have
a pre-shared Secretij, then Eve’s only option is to launch an online guess attack on
the pre-shared Secretij.
6.2 Other threats
Leaked master key. If the KUi of useri is leaked, then all data individually owned
by useri will be exposed. Additionally, the shared data, which is encrypted by the
keys derived from the leaked KUi , can be also uncovered.
Brute-force key. We do not send any password protected messages to cloud service
providers. All user files and key files are encrypted by high-entropy keys (256 bit), so
exhaustive key search is possibly infeasible.
Data leakage. The example of public access to the sensitive user data due to the
vulnerabilities in the design of the cloud services is also available (see e.g., [39]). In
Keyfob all user files and emails are encrypted before being sent to the cloud server.
So, users no longer need to rely on the provider for data leakage. User data is no
longer subject to be leaked, given that the encryption algorithm does not have any
backdoor (e.g., [73]).
Key manipulation. Encrypted key files are stored at the cloud server. By modifying
the keys in key files, an attacker can form a DoS attack by restricting users from
retrieving original data, but can not retrieve as well.
Collusion attack. Few prior works (e.g., [61, 21]) rely on multiple parties to transfer
encrypted data and encryption keys. In those solutions, if relying parties collude, or
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a government on top of them collects data from them, then user data will be leaked.
Our system does not send encryption keys unencrypted out of a user machine. We
also do not rely on any trusted party. So, collusion attacks are no longer possible.
6.3 Limitations
Any threats from a malicious browser extension or malware in the local machine is
beyond the scope of this work. Also, we do not hide content metadata (e.g., filename,
encryption algorithm, email header parameters) from the service providers. Our
Gmail plugin currently does not encrypt email attachments. Keyfob does not achieve
forward secrecy and non-repudiation, as it uses the shared key for content encryption,
instead of the DH-EKE session key.
Malicious browser extensions. The Keyfob browser extension accesses a local
key database, where master keys are stored. That allows other browser extensions to
access local files and retrieve master keys. We argue that if malicious extensions have
access to local files, they are able to read all files in a local drive. They do not need
keys anymore.
Threats on metadata. For cloud storage, filenames remain as plaintext in our
current implementation, as we use full filepath including filenames to map per-file
encryption key. We acknowledge that filenames can let a provider know the posses-
sion of certain files. Other file metadata (e.g., filesize, timestamps) is also exposed
to providers. Also, encryption configurations e.g., key size, block size, mode of op-
eration are stored in plaintext, and not verified upon retrieval. Any modifications of
these parameters can cause DoS. For web-email, header parameters (e.g., From:, To:,
Subject:) are also exposed to email providers.
Several serious privacy threats from metadata are known (see e.g., [76, 23]). There
50
also exist few solutions to hide the metadata that Keyfob exposes. EncFS originally
offers filename encryption. Changing in the Keyfob design will allow to adopt file-
name encryption. Several PGP and S/MIME based solutions (e.g., [20, 33, 51]) offer
attachment encryption for emails. The Darkmail technical alliance [16] is a recent
proposal to radically change the current email infrastructure to enable private email
communications. One of the major goals of this project is to hide content metadata.




This chapter includes the discussion on usability and deployability issues for adopting
Keyfob.




























Keyfob∗ 3 3 3
Table 2: Comparing Firefox Sync and EncFS with Keyfob∗. Keyfob∗ represents the
Keyfob extension and our encryption plugins together. Here, empty box indicates the
stated feature is not offered.
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7.1.1 User steps
We leverage Firefox Sync and EncFS to build Keyfob and the Dropbox plugin. For
rest of the report, we use Keyfob∗ to represent Keyfob and our encryption plugins
together. Table 2 illustrates the modifications we added in terms of user experience.
Firefox Sync requires user registration. Even though Keyfob establishes session keys
and transfers master keys through the Firefox Sync server, Keyfob simplifies user
experience by removing the user registration requirement. EncFS and Firefox Sync
both require a separate password. EncFS uses the user-chosen password to encrypt
the master key and Firefox Sync authenticates a user with the password. We exclude
the requirement of both passwords. We protect the master key with a session key
and authenticate a user with the pre-shared PIN, so we exclude all password prompts
from our implementations. On the first run, EncFS lets a user to choose the encryp-
tion configuration (e.g., encryption algorithm, key size, and block size). We assume
choosing encryption configuration on the first run inconvenient for most users and
remove from our implementation (Section 5.2 lists default configuration). There is a

























Dropbox 1/1 1/3 0/1
Gmail 1/1 0/2 0/1
Dropbox + Gmail 2/2 1/4 0/1
Table 3: Comparing total number of operations and resources required for regular
cloud services (e.g., Dropbox and Gmail) and our proposal for single-user in the
format r/e, where r is the regular mode of operation and e is the encrypted mode.
Here, the encrypted mode includes Keyfob∗.
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7.1.2 Software requirements
Table 3 compares user experience between the regular cloud services and our imple-
mentation. Keyfob does not introduce any additional authentication. So, a user faces
only regular authentication steps from Dropbox and Gmail. For regular Dropbox, a
user installs a client app to use Dropbox in a desktop environment. For Gmail, we
consider its web interface. So, we consider that it does not require any client applica-
tion in the regular mode. Being application-independent, the Keyfob extension lets
our solution require a single browser extension to facilitate key transfer for different
cloud services. The number of required client app grows with the encryption plug-
ins, which support encryption for different services. To offer encrypted cloud storage
and email services using Gmail and Dropbox, we need 4 client apps in total, which
includes the regular Dropbox desktop client and Keyfob∗. The regular mode of cloud
services does not need any master key. Our solution demands users to store and man-
age (e.g., backup) a master key, which is later used to derive all other keys. We keep
Keyfob independent of any encryption plugin in a sense that the key establishment
and encryption can be performed in either order. Encrypted email can be sent before
encryption key is transferred. Of course, the receiver would require encryption keys
to decrypt an email.
7.1.3 Usability issues
Usability issues in our solution include the following. We fix few of them in our
implementation.
Random PIN vs. pre-shared password. Originally in Firefox Sync, a PIN is
randomly generated at the beginning of a key transfer. So, the users are unable to
share the PIN in advance. To allow the users sharing a Secretij during any prior
meeting or communication, we introduce user-chosen Secretij as another option (see
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Figure 6).
Restrictions on changing filepath. As we store the per-file key mapped with
the filepath, any change in the location of the encrypted files from Dropbox’s web
interface would fail our encryption plugin. We plan to develop an encryption plugin
for the Dropbox web interface in the future.
Oﬄine key back up. A user must store the master key (KUi) oﬄine to recover
all her contents. Also, to derive the shared master key (KUij), an initiator needs to
present her own master key. In Section 4.4, we discuss few possible ways to back up
a key oﬄine.
Service-specific intermediate application. For each cloud service, users are re-
quired to use a separate encryption plugin. Web interfaces for several cloud services
can be possibly facilitated in a single browser extension.
Increased number of keys. To facilitate sharing, symmetric-key based system
increases the number of keys significantly (O(n2)). Whereas, the public key based
solutions can restrict this number to O(n). Keyfob only requires the receiver side to
back up the shared key to avoid asking the sender to transfer the shared key (KUij)
via a new DH-EKE session. The sender side can derive the shared key from the
master key (KUi). Thus we half the total number of keys required to be stored.
7.2 Deployability
To transfer the master key, we utilize the Firefox Sync server. Although the server
allocates a channel for each session for Keyfob and forwards “easy setup” messages, the
load on the server increases very slowly as key transfer is not a frequent event in our
system. Still, if Firefox decides to disallow such external requests or changes its design,
we or anyone else can easily host a low-cost Sync server (discussed in Section 2.1).
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Hosting our own server does not lose security, as the server is considered untrusted in
our system. We calculate the total number of requests to the server considering that
there are 100,000 Keyfob users having 2 devices on average and everyday there are
5,000 new users for Keyfob. Also, we assume that each user on every two days contact
a new person, which requires them to establish a key. Each day, only new users use
the server to add their second device. The first device does not communicate with
the Firefox Sync server without the need of adding a new device or establishing a key
with a new user. So, new users generate 5,000 requests to the server to add the second
device. Among 100,000 Keyfob users, 50,000 users on average add a new person to
their contacts everyday. So, to transfer keys among pair of users, Keyfob generates
50,000 requests to the Firefox Sync server daily. In total, the server will handle 55,000
DH-EKE requests per day to support Keyfob. During each DH-EKE session, a sender
sends two messages (one is about 1,218 bytes long and another is about 616 bytes
long), and a receiver sends a message of 1,218 bytes through the Sync server (see [55]
for the message size). To process a DH-EKE session, the Sync server handles about
3 KB data. So, per day on average the server will process approximately 160.08 MB,
which is affordable even by a low-cost server.
Deduplication is a very popular storage and bandwidth optimization mechanism,
where a file is uploaded only if it is not already stored in the cloud server. As our
solution encrypts files with random encryption keys, it cannot support cross-user
deduplication. However, deduplication for the same user is partially possible. When
the user changes an existing file then modified blocks are uploaded only if block-level
deduplication is performed. Encrypted files and emails restrict service providers to
benefit from content-aware advertising. However, non-targeted ads can be served.
Currently, offering encryption support for each cloud service requires an interme-



































































































































Dropbox [19] 3 3 7 7
iCloud Keychain [3] 3 3 3 3 3 7 7 7
End-to-end [31] 3 3 3 3 3 7 7 7
PGP [13] 3 3 3 7 7
Syme [74] 3 3 3 3 7 7 7
FriendlyMail [61] 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
CaaS [21] 3 3 3 3 7 7
Safebox [66] 3 3 3 3 3 7 7
Wuala [45] 3 3 3 3 3 3 7 7
BoxCryptor [11] 3 3 3 3 3 7 7 7
SpiderOak [69] 3 3 3 3 3 3 7 7
ARKpX [4] 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
Keyfob∗ 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 7 7
Table 4: Comparing different existing solutions. Here, a checkmark (3) for features
means the corresponding service offers that feature; a crossmark (7) for attacks in-
dicates that a specific attack is not addressed; and a crossmark (7) for requirements
marks that a specific requirement is needed. An empty box indicates the stated
feature/requirement is not offered/not needed or the stated attack is prevented.
interface, APIs (if available) and offered features from different vendors for a specific
cloud differ significantly; thus it might not be possible to support different vendors
with a single encryption plugin. Our Dropbox plugin is implemented in such a way
that it is usable with other popular services (e.g., GoogleDrive, OneDrive) for syncing
without any change. For the sharing support they require additional implementation,
as it involves service-specific API calls.
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7.3 Comparison
Comparison among different approaches are presented in Table 4. The solutions
having more checkmarks (3) and less crossmarks (7) are generally considered good,
though each feature does not have equal importance. For example, ARKpX offers
all features but auto-key-transfer, which we consider a major drawback. To compare
existing services with Keyfob, we select 7 features, 3 attacks and 3 requirements.
Syncing and sharing are very common features for cloud services. They allow users
to transfer contents between multiple user-owned devices and between different users.
Client-side-encryption is to offer encryption for any user-content leaving the user
machine. We put symmetric encryption only as a feature to identify the services
solely depending on symmetric encryption. All asymmetric-based solutions is rely on
password protection for private keys or trust the provider not to change the public
keys. The password-free feature includes the services that do not use user-chosen
password for data confidentiality. If a service does not introduce any trusted third
party (e.g., key server), then we check the no trusted party feature. The auto-key-
transfer feature is marked when keys are transferred by the tool rather than the
user. We consider that auto-key-transfer might need minimum user involvement (i.e.,
pressing few buttons, entering a password or name). Attacks from a curious provider
include the access of user-data when it is stored in the clear. A malicious provider
is one-step ahead, which may employ significant effort (e.g., brute forcing password,
replacing public keys intentionally) compared to a curious provider to access user-
data. Under the collusion attack, we consider the attacks possible when different
providers collude, or user-data from different providers is collected. The requirements
are considered as the overheads and limitations of a system. The services, having pre-
key-exchange crossmarked, requires key exchange prior to any encrypted data transfer.
The services with user-level-keys means that they create and manage key at the client
58
end, and requires user involvement. The key server is a trusted or semi-trusted third
party key management service. Next, we discuss our analogy while rating different
solutions in Table 4.
iCloud Keychain. iCloud Keychain [3] is a key backup mechanism for the single-user
case only. So, it does not offer the sharing feature. iCloud offers end-to-end encryption
rather than relying on the Apple server. Each registered device generates its own
public/private key pair to encrypt data before uploading to the server. Although,
iCloud requires user password to authenticate a new user, iCloud never uses passwords
to derive encryption keys. As iCloud never exposes user private key to the server
or any third party, iCloud does not require any trusted party. The Keychain tool
transfers public keys to the server with the involvement of users such as authentication
and approval. Both curious and malicious providers apparently can not access user
data as long as they do not possess any device private key. Private keys never leave
a client device. Even to modify the public keys, iCloud requires to sign with the
corresponding private keys. But, recent revelations (discussed in Section 2.2.2 show
that Apple or any third party is able to conduct surveillance over users. So, we
consider iCloud to be vulnerable to the malicious provider. As iCloud does not
rely on any trusted party, it is collusion-proof. Like any other public key based
systems, to avail the end-to-end encryption service users must exchange public keys
in iCloud Keychain. iCloud generates user keys at the client side without requiring
any additional key server.
PGP. PGP is mainly designed for multi-party email communication. PGP does
not offer syncing originally. Few recent PGP-based plugins (e.g., end-to-end) offer
syncing by encrypting the private key by a user password. Here, we uncheck the
syncing feature considering the original PGP proposal. PGP provides end-to-end
encryption between users, where each user has his/her own public/private key pair.
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PGP does not involve user password in generating keys. Rather than relying on a
trusted party, PGP creates web of trust among known users to certify the authenticity
of public keys. Failing to create a trust path between users may cause the creation
of fake public keys (cf. examples of fake PGP keys [2, 14]). High dependency on the
trust model lets us uncheck the no trusted party feature. The key transfer in PGP
is non-trivial and involves users. So, we consider that PGP is missing the auto-key-
transfer feature. The web of trust mechanism in PGP helps to avoid the dependence
on a trusted provider or third party e.g., certification authorities, and prevents threats
from malicious providers. Like most public-key-based systems, PGP requires pre-key-
exchange to share encrypted emails. Additionally, PGP generates public/private key
pairs at the client end without requiring any key server.
Syme. Syme is a privacy-friendly group conversation service. Currently, Syme does
not support multi-device syncing. Although, Syme uses symmetric keys for encryp-
tion, there is a public/private keypair per user to protect encryption keys. All en-
cryption keys are generated randomly, and none is generated from user password.
During key establishment period, Syme relies on the server to keep the integrity of
the ephemeral keys. So, our rating considers that Syme is missing the no trusted
party feature. As keys are generated and managed by the Syme client, the auto-key-
transfer is checked. For the possibility of faking the ephemeral keys by a provider,
our evaluation marks Syme as vulnerable to the malicious provider. Syme requires
pre-key-exchange and user-level-keys.
FriendlyMail. FriendlyMail offers encrypted email service with the Gmail web ser-
vice. Encryption keys are transferred through Facebook as a private message. From
any device users can access emails by logging into Gmail and Facebook. So, we check
syncing. FriendlyMail only generates random high-entropy symmetric keys. Facebook
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is trusted for not disclosing encryption keys to Google or the government. Auto-key-
transfer is offered requiring login to Facebook. Any provider alone possibly can not
breach confidentiality of this system. But, as soon as Google and Facebook colludes,
or the government of the same jurisdiction collects data from both, the user data is
leaked. FriendlyMail does not demand any of the requirement listed in the table.
CaaS. CaaS is a third party key management service, which provides and stores en-
cryption keys for shared data between users. As CaaS is not targeted for syncing
keys between user devices, we uncheck syncing. CaaS facilitates end-to-end encryp-
tion between users. User password is only used to authenticate users to the server.
Encryption keys are stored at the CaaS server considering the server trusted. CaaS
does not require any key transfer, as encryption keys are not generated at the client
end. Like FriendlyMail, any provider including the CaaS server can not retrieve user
data. But, CaaS is vulnerable to collusion attack. CaaS is of the very few proposals,
which require a key server.
Keyfob. Keyfob is designed to offer end-to-end encryption for different cloud based
services. The single user case and two-user case in Keyfob cover syncing and shar-
ing respectively. For encryption, Keyfob totally depends on high-entropy symmetric
keys. Even though we use PINs during the key transfer, DH-EKE invalidates any
oﬄine attack on the PIN. During the key transfer phase, the Firefox Sync server
is used without trusting for data confidentiality. Also, Keyfob offers the auto-key-
transfer involving users minimally i.e., entering password and pressing few buttons.
By achieving all the features in the list, Keyfob possibly bypasses all three attacks
listed in the table. Not involving user password and trusted third party apparently
avoids threats from the malicious provider. The no trusted party feature allows Key-
fob to be collusion-proof. Keyfob achieves all the features, and possibly avoids all
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the attacks enlisted with the price of two major requirements. Keyfob keys are gen-
erated, maintained and stored at the client end. To recover user data, backing up
the master key (KUi) is mandatory. Additionally, Keyfob needs a server to conduct
the key transfer. Unlike most other approaches, the server in Keyfob is untrusted for
data confidentiality.
Other approaches. We include Dropbox in our comparison to see where the most
popular cloud services (e.g., Gmail, Facebook, OneDrive) stand. Google’s end-to-end
is a JavaScript implementation of OpenPGP, we consider it separately. End-to-end
uses symmetric encryption for content encryption. But, we uncheck the Symmetric
encryption field, as it leverages public key systems for key transfer. Unlike PGP,
End-to-end offers syncing between devices. To support syncing, End-to-end involves
user-chosen pass-phrases to encrypt private keys. There are other password-based
solutions. Wuala and SpiderOak derives the master key from the user-chosen pass-
word. BoxCryptor transfers the private key to multiple user machines by protecting
it by the user password. ARKpX relies on the user to transfer keys. It does not offer
automatic key transfer.
All approaches except Keyfob and ARKpX either use public key system, password-
based symmetric-key, or a trusted third party. ARKpX does not offer the key transfer
feature, and users are responsible for key transfer. We notice that all public key
based systems that offer syncing is password dependent, as they transfer private keys
protected by a user password. Except Keyfob, we found CaaS and Syme password-
free. The systems (e.g., Caas, Syme), which rely on a trusted party (e.g., third
party or service provider), are vulnerable to either malicious provider or collusion
attack. Ignoring recent revelations of iCloud vulnerabilities in forensic services, iCloud
Keychain is able to protect public key from integrity loss. But, iCloud requires as
many keys as any symmetric-encryption-based approaches, even though iCloud uses
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public key systems. Comparing with others Keyfob outstands by providing all listed
features, protecting from main attacks, and requiring less infrastructure.
7.4 Future work
Sharing a secret over an insecure channel is an open problem. We identify finding
an efficient way to share secrets as a potential future work. In this thesis work, we
consider the Tor hidden services [77] to share secrets over insecure channel. This work
is ongoing. We assume that the reader is familiar with Tor (see [78] for details).
Tor hidden services allow users to offer different services hiding their locations.
The steps of registering and offering/accessing a hidden service are:
1. To start a hidden service, Alice selects few nodes from the Tor circuit as intro-
ductory points (IP), generates a public key, and derives the onion address from
the public key. Rest of this section refers an introductory point of a Tor circuit
using IP.
2. Alice advertises her IPs, onion address and public key to the global Tor hidden
service database.
3. Bob inquires Alice’s IPs and public key using the onion address.
4. Bob sends a one-time secret and a rendezvous point (RP) protected by Alice’s
public key to one of the Alice’s IPs.
5. Alice presents the one-time secret to Bob’s RP. Thus, a Tor circuit is built via
Bob’s RP.
6. Further communication continues using this circuit.
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To share a secret, we may leverage this infrastructure and build a circuit between
two parties before sending the secret. We identify several assumptions so that we can
simplify the problem. Our assumptions are:
1. IDs (onion addresses) and introductory points of friends are available without
any integrity loss. Apparently, this is the most challenging part to achieve. We
discuss challenges in details later of this section. Email address is one choice as
ID. In this case, we do not need confidentiality.
2. All messages are sent over mixed network.
3. No relay including introductory points will be repeated for two consecutive runs
for the same source-destination pair.
Alice HS(A) IP(A) IP(B) HS(B) Bob
(nounceA ‖ packageA) xor keyA
//• •
• • (nounceA xor keyA) ‖ packageA xor keyA xor keyBoo
packageA xor keyB
//• •
Figure 21: Secret sharing using Tor hidden service, Here, HS(A) and HS(B) are the
hidden services of Alice, and Bob and IP(A) and IP(B) are introductory points of
Alice and Bob respectively. Also, packageA= idA ‖ cookieA ‖ rpA ‖ pubKeyA.
Next, we discuss the steps (see Figure 21) to share a secret between two users. If
Alice wants to share a secret with Bob, then
1. Bob will derive an onion address from his email address and try to connect
to that address as a client to check whether a hidden service with this onion
address already exists. If this request fails, then Bob knows that this onion
address is free and he registers his hidden service with that address.
2. Alice sends a nonce and a package to Bob’s onion address using Bob’s IPs. The
package consists of her rendez-vous point (rpA), one time secret (cookieA) and
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public key (pubKeyA). We assume that Alice can derive Bob’s onion address
from Bob’s email address, which is assumed to be available to Alice and retrieve
introductory points. She sends this first message through Bob’s introductory
point (IP(B)).
3. After getting the first message, Bob does not know from whom he gets it. So,
Bob keeps the nonce part as it is and encrypts the rest part with his key (keyB)
and broadcasts to the hidden services of his all contacts.
4. Bob’s friends who have not initiated any session will ignore the second message.
Others will decrypt the first part of the message with their keys and verify with
their nonce. Alice will find a match and then remove her key from the rest part
of the message. Now, the package is only encrypted by Bob’s key. Alice sends
this message to Bob’s hidden service.
5. Bob can decrypt the third message and retrieve rpA, cookieA and pubKeyA.
Further communication with Alice will be conducted through rpA encrypted by
pubKeyA.
This approach challenges us with following issues:
1. An onion address should be derived from a publicly available ID (i.e., email
address) so that peers can derive the address without requiring any additional
information. Also, user email address is required to be reached to all peers
without any integrity loss.
2. If a publicly available ID is used, then one can open a hidden service using
another one’s ID. Eve can open a hidden service with Bob’s email address
before Bob. Our current proposal can not stop Eve, but Bob is notified that
already a hidden service is open with his email address. Any link with the email
ownership might make the task of eve more difficult.
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3. If we consider the Tor hidden service database untrusted, then we can not store
the public key in the clear any more.
Also, we need to consider about different attack points to address any MiTM.
Introductory point. Eve can reside in the network as an introductory point. She
can intercept the first message and play the role of Bob. She prepares the second
message with her key (keyE) and broadcasts to all Bob’s contacts, which we
assume is not a secret. Alice removes her key from the third message and sends
back to Bob’s hidden service. Now, the third message is the package encrypted
by Eve’s key. But, Eve will not get the message in step 3, because this time
Alice will use another introductory point. Bob will receive this message and
decrypt. As the sender ID is not valid, he will ignore this message.
Attacker friend. As all contacts of Alice will receive the first message, we consider
that any of her friends might be malicious. A malicious friend can truncate the
first message and encrypt with her own key (keyE). It will result an invalid user
ID at Bob’s end. So, it will not help the attacker.




Few large for-profit corporations (e.g., Google, Facebook) are now brokering most
user communications, and effectively in control of most stored user data. Besides,
governments are accessing cloud-stored user data in bulk with questionable/shadowy
legal apparatus, ignoring century-old privacy rights. Designing privacy-preserving
mechanisms for existing cloud-based services, specifically a key management mecha-
nism to facilitate crypto support in this ecosystem appears to be quite challenging.
An obvious reason is the availability of several diverse features in cloud services that
are difficult to accommodate with a privacy tool; such features include: syncing in
multiple user-owned devices, online backup, sharing of stored data with peer users,
online group editing of a shared document, and searching within plaintext user data.
In this work, we proposed Keyfob, a key manager for end-to-end encryption in the
cloud ecosystem, and leverage Keyfob to offer privacy-friendly cloud services (e.g.,
cloud storage, email). We are yet to cover few popular features (e.g., online editing).
We acknowledge that user-experience-based features of Keyfob will be required to be
validated by a user study. The design of Keyfob and implementation of Keyfob plugins
for different services highlight challenges in less-explored symmetric-key approaches.
Our hope is that Keyfob will motivate more researchers in solving the long-standing
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problem of enabling end-to-end encryption in a cloud-based environment, especially
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